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I
     In 1972, with reverberations from the student movement still audible, Rodney 
Needham concluded his book on the nature of anthropological understanding Belief, 
Language and Experience (1972) with a quote from Einstein. It is worth quoting here: 
"The one eternally incomprehensible fact about the universe is that it is 
comprehensible. The solitary comprehensible fact about human experience is that it is 
incomprehensible." This is a very pessimistic remark, indeed. Einstein's words have 
made me realize that anthropology might be an impossible attempt to cross cultural 
borders. 
     But these days it is not the epistemological impossibility, something that 
Needham has articulated, that does not allow anthropologists to sleep well at night, but 
an impossibility of another sort. If I am not mistaken, it is concerned with the "ethics of 
intercultural communication" to which Professor Inaga has called our attention. We are 
being forced, in his analysis, to become aware of the "violence in border crossing," or, 
more specifically, to the violence in cross-cultural representation maintained during 
times of the uneven distribution of power as Gayatri Spivak (1988) has pointed out in 
"Can the Subaltern Speak." Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Spivak criticizes 
the imperialism of power with which "First World Intellectuals" create subaltern 
subjects, particularly when these "voiceless" subalterns (oppression has produced a 
class of voiceless people) are made to speak for themselves. After her critique of the 
cavalier manner in which Deleuze and Foucault have enthusiastically endorsed the 
project of allowing prisoners to speak for themselves (see the chapter "Intellectuals and 
Power" in Language, Counter Memory, Practice, 1977[1972]), crossing cultural 
borders seems to become even more difficult, because there is always a Professor Inaga
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reminding one of "the deceptiveness [sic] of the act of our representing voiceless 
others." The sixties are making a comeback, it seems to me, with a vengeance, and 
what is worse, I am now held accountable.
II
     Keeping in mind that this sort of critique contributes to my sleepless nights, I 
would like to direct a question to Professor Kurimoto who has stated that his duty as a 
scholar is "to give voice to those unheard ones, and to present them in a way intelligible 
and meaningful to those who are not familiar with the local contexts." What would he 
say in response to the comment made by the anthropologist Stephen A. Tyler in his 
chapter "Post-Modern Ethnography," in Writing Culture, ed. J. Clifford and G. Marcus 
(1986)? Let me quote from Tyler, even if it is a little bit long: "some ethnographers 
have tamed the savage, not with the pen, but with the tape recorder, reducing him to a 
"straight man
," as in the script of some obscure comic routine, for even as they think to 
have returned to "oral performance" or "dialogue," in order that the native have a place 
in the text, they exercise total control over her discourse and steal the only things she 
has left--her voice." Prof. Kurimoto's response might help me sleep a little better. 
     Yes, indeed, I, as an anthropologist, would like to sleep a little better. Even if I 
do believe in, at least, the correctness of a part of --not all of--Spivak's and Tyler's 
critiques, my sympathy still lies with Professor Kurimoto's position. I think, however, 
that he cannot ignore Professor Inaga's prudent nudging. 
      As far as Professor Inaga goes, I cannot feel too enthusiastic, for the same 
reason that I did not feel empowered after reading Rodney Needham's book, when I 
listen to a series of his anecdotes, full of "aporias" in cross-cultural understandings. I 
would like to ask Professor Inaga what sort of future of cross-cultural understanding he 
could imagine, given all the aporias he has enumerated? Should we stop our efforts in 
cross-cultural understanding since our current "ethics" are inadequately equipped to 
deal with difficult inter-cultural situations? 
      Nevertheless, my intention is not to devalue Professor Inaga's statements. It is 
quite the contrary. In other words, it is incumbent upon us, as anthropologists, to 
respond to the Spivakian and Tylerian critiques of the sort that Professor Inaga has 
presented. Thus, I want to hear how Professor Kurimoto might engage Professor Inaga's 
incisive critique against anthropology's so-called raison d'etre of "giving voice to the 
voiceless." (As a footnote, "giving voice to the voiceless" is, I add, problematic in 
looking back at the history of anthropology itself.) These days, anthropologists should 
not, at least, attend a sophisticated "theoretical party" without the proper attire.
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III
     I think it might be useful at this point to ask to what extent, in what sort of 
context, can Spivakian and Tylerian critique, which Professor Inaga has so approvingly 
cited, be meaningful not only to anthropologists but also, for lack of a better term, to 
the "local" people, since such a critique points to the site of articulation of the subject 
of subjected subalterns? To put the problem more concretely, I think it might be useful 
to make a close check at such a site of articulation: Who is giving a voice to whom? 
Under what circumstances? Who controls the conditions of subjugation? Perhaps the 
word "control" is not very suitable in describing a site of negotiation. 
      The anthropological stance of "giving-voice-to-the-voiceless" and the 
philosophical equivalent of "allowing the voiceless to speak for themselves" are both 
highly problematic because both positions do not attend to the operation of power that 
constitutes the dyadic relationship between the anthropologist and the "natives." Such 
positions function as though they are complementary categories constituted by power 
and, thus, they hide their own genesis. 
     Too broad and generalizing a stroke of argument might make us overlook the 
possibilities for re-articulation in the politics of representation, because the positions 
mentioned above present an impasse: for example, I have pointed out elsewhere that 
what is lacking in these two positions is a way of envisioning a complete speech act in 
which speaking must "gain a hearing," as bell hooks in Yearning (1990) has so astutely 
insisted. Such possibility for completing a speech act emerges from practical acts of 
historically situated negotiation, not out of theoretical elaboration and refinement, 
however sophisticated they might appear. 
     What I have in mind is, for example, a famous Latin American testimonio such 
as I, Rigoberta Menchu (1984); did Elizabeth Burgos, a Venezuelan anthropologist and 
a left-wing solidarity worker in Paris, totally control the text since Burgos edited it? Did 
Burgos imperialistically construct a subaltern subject as she recorded and edited 
Menchu's recollections, even if Menchu's stance depended on her being able to 
represent her people, that is, the Ki'chee' of Guatemala. Did Burgos use the testimonio 
as a vehicle to extract identification in support of her cause from her potential readers? 
     The site at which the subaltern subject actually emerges is more complicated 
than the Spivakian and Tylerian critiques have us believe. To allow more sensitivity to 
the complicated process of negotiation, I think we need to remain precisely where such 
a process takes place, that is, metaphorically speaking, on the cultural borders where a 
"crossing" takes place
, although such borders are rife with contradictions. But, I do not
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think, even for a moment, that to come to a conclusion about the contradictory nature of 
border crossing would make me sleep any better than before. Or could it be that 
insomnia is the price contemporary anthropological consciousness must pay?
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